Introduction
Previous studies proposed theories to explain a firm's choice between public debt financing and private debt financing. Fama (1985) argued that public debt financing requires producing public information, which is costlier than the information required by private creditors. Therefore, only large firms tend to issue public debt. Diamond (1989) , Diamond (1991) , Besanko and Kantas (1993) , and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) described the role of financial intermediates in reducing ex-ante incentive problems. Firms with major incentive problems may use intermediaries for their screening and monitoring services. This service is costly, so firms with minor incentive problems avoid it by raising debt directly from the public.
An additional advantage of private debt financing is the efficiency of liquidation and reorganization in the event of financial distress (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991, Bolton and Freixas, 2000) . Renegotiation with public debt-holders is much more complicated due to major conflicts of interest between debtholders that may ultimately lead to a value-destructing liquidation process. Firms with a higher probability of financial distress (higher credit risk) may burden intermediaries with the higher cost of raising debt in order to avoid inefficient liquidation. Firms facing lower financial distress probabilities, on the other hand, find the benefits of renegotiating private debts less attractive and therefore tend to rely more on public debt.
Overall, the aforementioned theories predict a higher tendency toward longterm debt-raising by larger and less risky firms. Databases classifying debt as publicly traded or privately held are almost nonexistent, and therefore only a limited number of papers have examined these theories empirically. Empirical research on public firms in the US confirmed the relationship between debt composition and credit quality. Cantillo and Wright (2000) showed that large, profitable companies with collateral do indeed raise debt directly from the public. Their results supported the hypothesis that intermediaries have better reorganization skills but also higher opportunity cost for capital than bondholders have. Denis and Mihov (2003) examined the choice between bank debt, non-bank private debt and public debt, and discovered that firms with the highest credit quality borrow from public sources, firms with medium credit quality borrow from banks, and firms with the lowest credit quality borrow from non-bank private lenders. Johnson (1997) discovered systematic use of bank debt among firms with access to the public debt market, suggesting that the benefits attributed to bank debt remain important even after firms cross the quality threshold that allows them access to the public debt market. Nevertheless, the greater the credit quality of a firm, the more it relies on public debt rather than on private debt.
Theoretical papers predicting the absence of low-quality firms in the corporate bond market assumed that market players are able to assess credit quality and incentive problems of potential debtors (Fama, 1985; Rajan, 1992) . We conjecture that this is not the case in underdeveloped capital markets. We use data from the Israeli capital market to investigate the quality of corporate bond issuers and the role of the financial institutions in the screening process on the corporate bond market.
The Israeli capital market underwent several major changes during the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Rising taxes and privatization revenues together with the government's policy of public debt reduction led to a decrease in the issuance of government bonds.
While the annual net governmental bond issuance in 2001-2004 averaged 1.1 percent of the GDP, it dropped to -1.6 percent in [2005] [2006] [2007] . As a consequence, the demand for fixed-income securities translated into tremendous growth in corporate bond issuance.
The corporate bond market, which was almost nonexistent prior to 2004, grew more than tenfold within a few years.
1 This new corporate bond market offered competition to the centralized banking system and hence was mostly perceived as a positive evolution. Critics, however, claim that many firms exploited Israeli institutional investors' lack of experience with this type of instrument to raise funds too cheaply.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the attributes of bond issuers during this period and investigate whether market conditions were indeed exploited by risky firms.
This study is consistent with Harford, Martos-Vila and Rhodes-Kroft (2015) who showed that firms take advantage of the rating inaccuracies on the US corporate bond market. In a broader perspective, this study also aligns with papers documenting the effect of stock valuation on capital structure: Welch (2004) , Dong, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2012) and Khan, Kogan and Serafeim (2012) It appears that institutional investors had major difficulties with screening potential bond issuers. Firms whose credit risk was underestimated by institutional investors could exploit this overpricing of bonds to replace bank debt with public debt.
Moreover, the miscalculations of the institutional investors exacerbated the moral hazard inherent in the corporate bond market. Cheap, unsecured debt financing and lack of covenants encouraged these firms to increase leverage and to impose a larger haircut on debt-holders in the event of default.
Given these special features of the Israeli corporate bond market, we question whether the behavior of the Israeli bond market was consistent with the aforementioned theoretical and empirical studies. In particular, we study whether the corporate bond market indeed catered to the highest quality firms. For this purpose, we empirically examine the determinants of debt composition for over 500 non-financial firms traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) from 1999 to 2009. We use manuallycollected credit rating data from the datasets of local rating agencies and the TASE website, as well as accounting and market data from the Super-Analyst dataset. Data on the share of financial institutions in corporate bond offerings is also manually collected from over 1000 reports on such offerings. We use Probit, OLS and Heckman regressions to examine the determinants of the choice to issue corporate bonds and the share of public debt in the total debt. We show that, in accordance with previous studies, higher quality firms (larger firms and those with higher market-to-book ratio) with credit ratings are more likely to issue bonds. Yet in 2007, unlike previous empirical studies, lower quality firms that do raise public debt tend to exhaust this market, and public debt constitutes a relatively larger fraction of their total debt. We also show that firms with higher fraction of bonds in their long-term debt had a higher tendency to The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 briefly describes the Israeli corporate bond market. Section 3 explains how the sample data is constructed, and Section 4 describes the methodology. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
The Israeli corporate bond market
The corporate bond market in Israel is relatively new. Until approximately thirty years ago, the financial market in Israel was based on government debt and an undeveloped stock market. The government financed its large deficits by issuing government bonds that were also used as the main investment securities for pension savings (by pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies). During the 1980s and 1990s, as the government deficit dropped dramatically, the government gradually Many corporate bonds are rated by at least one of the two local rating agencies (S&P-Maalot and Midroog). These ratings are subject to rating shopping and rating catering because bond issuers can choose by which one of the two to be rated. Bakalyar and Galil (2014) found that during 2004-2012 while one agency (Midroog) systematically assigned higher ratings, the ratings of the other agency (S&P-Maalot)
were inflated due to rating shopping. Yet, despite the many features that encourage rating inflation, the resulting distortion was relatively small (one notch). Afik, Feinstein and Galil (2014) Following the financial crisis of 2008 and the difficulties experienced by many public firms that issued bonds, the Ministry of Finance decided to establish a committee (known as the Hodak Committee) to review the current situation and decide on standard parameters for institutional investors that invest in corporate bonds. In its final report, the committee mentioned that institutional investors hold most of the unregistered and registered commercial bonds on the TASE, making those investors the most dominant factor in that market. 3 Nevertheless, the large number of institutional investors and the inflexible supply of investment capital make it hard for them to translate their dominance into a forceful negotiating position. In this situation, the firms that issue public debt become dominant and dictate the conditions of the debt issued.
Data
The data are mostly obtained from the Super-Analyst database, which contains financial report data for Israeli public firms traded on the TASE. This database also separates debt into bonds and other debts. The data on government bonds is obtained studies (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Frank and Goyal, 2009) , firms in the financial sector are excluded because their financial structure is influenced by different factors than those influencing non-financial firms.
Methodology
To examine a firm's debt composition, we first define a dummy variable to represent the holding of corporate bonds (Bond Dummy i,t). This dummy equals one when firm has outstanding corporate bonds in year . In addition, the following equation for debt composition is defined:
where Bi,t is the book value of firm i's long-term bonds at year t, and LTDi,t is the book value of firm i's long-term debt at year t. 4 We explore the determinants of the decision to issue corporate bonds (Bond Dummyi,t) and the percentage of bonds out of total debt ( , ). When examining bonds out of total debt, we also control for the possible selection bias in the sample of firms with outstanding corporate bonds, using a two-step regression (Heckman, 1979) model. The following model is defined for the first stage of the method:
where , is a dummy variable that equals one when firm has outstanding bonds at time . , −1 denotes the set of firm-level explanatory variables for firm i at year − 1. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year to be included in the information set, thus limiting endogeneity problems. α, β and are the parameters being estimated. The firm-level variables , −1 are in accordance with previous literature (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Hovakimian, 2003; Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2009 ) and include the following variables:
MVA to Assets is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. In this definition, the market value of assets is a firm's market value of equity plus its debt book value. The book value of assets is defined as a firm's book value of equity plus its book value of debt.
LN Assets is the log of total (book) assets.
EBIT to Assets is earnings before interest and tax, divided by total (book) assets.
Dummy: rated equals one when a firm has a debt rating. As noted by Bakalyar and Galil (2014) , firms have the right not to accept a provided rating if it seems too low.
Firms that decide to accept the rating usually have received a high rating and proceed to issue public debt.
Median industry leverage is calculated where leverage is as:
where Di,t is the book value of firm i's debt in year t. The market value of the equity of firm i in year t is defined by , • , , where Si,t is the number of common shares outstanding in year t, and Pi,t is the price per share in year t. Frank and Goyal (2009) found that median industry leverage is the most important influence on leverage, and that it sums a number of smaller effects, such as stock price volatility and industry regulation. Age is the time (in years) since the firm was established. This variable proxies for credit record. Creditors value firms with a longer credit record more highly because of their lower exposure to asymmetric information. Such debtors also suffer less from moral hazard because of their incentive to maintain their good reputation. Gorton (1996) showed the effect on reputation that issuing notes for the first time has on the early bank note market.
In the second stage of the Heckman estimation, we estimate the following conditioned equation:
where, , is a set of firm-specific variables similar to those of the first stage ( , ), except for Rating-Dummy, Median industry leverage and Age. We also use credit rating dummies based on S&P-Maalot ratings (if there is one) or Midroog ratings (if there is no S&P-Maalot rating). Clustering is used in both stages in order to correct standard errors for possible serial correlation.
We estimate equations (1) and (2) first represents the period before the expansion of the corporate market, and the second, the peak of the market. To ensure robustness, we also estimate equations (1) and (2) as independent equations. Equation (1) is estimated using a standard Probit approach and equation (2) using an OLS regression.
To further support our results we also examine the effect of bond reliance on firms' tendency to default. , and , are lagged one year to be included in the information set, thus limiting endogeneity problems. Table 1 
Results

Descriptive Statistics
Have firms replaced private loans with corporate bonds?
The rise in the Bonds to LTD ratio may be due to a rise in corporate bond issuance, a fall in private debt or both. It is interesting to ask whether firms used the evolution of corporate bond market to raise new debt or to replace private debt with public debt or both. It may be that bond issuers only exploited the lax screening in the bond market for raising leverage. However, if private debt is replaced by public debt, it may be a result of commercial banks' willingness to transfer troubled debtors into the hands of the unexperienced institutional investors. Hence, this examination also reveals whether the potentially lax screening may have had positive outcomes for commercial banks.
To investigate this question, we analyze data on cash flow and long-term debt.
The pairwise correlation between net cash flow from corporate bond issuance and net cash flow from long-term debt issuance is positive and equal to 0.38 (statistically significant at the 1% level). 7 This result indicates that firms that increased long-term debt tended to increase outstanding corporate bonds and vice versa. This finding confirms the hypothesis that the rise in Bonds to LTD was at least partially due to the issuance of new corporate bonds, in addition to outstanding long-term debt.
To examine if the new bonds replaced other bonds, we run a random-effect regression explaining net cash flow from bonds (NCFB):
The Table 2 .
First, we observe that the coefficient of NNCFL is negative and statistically significant in both periods, indicating that firms that increased their outstanding corporate bonds tended to reduce private debt, and vice versa. The coefficient of PNCFL is statistically insignificant in both periods. These two results indicate that private loans and corporate bonds were mostly substitutes rather than complementary.
Firms tended to issue new bonds to replace private bonds rather than to supplement them.
However, the regression constant in both periods is positive and statistically significant, indicating a tendency to issue bonds regardless the net cash flow from loans. 
Have low-quality firms issued more bonds than high-quality firms?
Now we examine the determinants of Bonds to LTD. We split the sample into two equal sub-groups based on the Bonds to LTD ratio. The table shows that compared to firms with low Bonds to LTD ratios, firms with high Bonds to LTD ratios have on average less leverage and lower earnings (EBIT to Assets), and are smaller in size (book value of assets). In addition, a lower proportion of these firms are rated. This finding is inconsistent with the results for the US market found by Johnson (1997) , where higher quality firms also tended to rely more heavily on public debt.
We extend our analysis to control for the selection bias that may exist among the firms with outstanding bonds. For this reason, we estimate the models presented in equations (1) and (2) to examine the determinants of debt composition. The results of the Heckman's Maximum Likelihood regression model, the Probit model and the OLS regression for these equations are shown in Tables 4 and Table 5 . We choose to estimate these equations in two time periods: in 2004, prior to the rapid expansion of the market (Table 4 ) and in 2007, in the peak of the market (Table 5 ).
The Wald test of independent equations in the Heckman model reveals that the equations (1) and (2) are independent in 2004 (Table 4 ) and dependent in 2007 (Table   5 ). Therefore, we base our conclusions regarding 2004 on the Probit and OLS regressions in Table 4 , and our conclusions regarding 2007 on the Heckman model in Table 5 .
Regarding 2004, we discover that the larger firms with greater profitability (defined as EBIT to Assets) with ratings had a higher tendency to issue bonds. Yet, the larger firms with greater Market-to-book, (MVA to Assets) had lower Bond to LTD. The effect of rating on Bond to LTD was monotonic, the higher the rating, the higher the
Bond to LTD. Firms rated AA or higher tended to have significantly larger portion of their debt in bonds.
The results regarding 2007 are somewhat different. We discover that larger firms, firms from industries with higher leverage, greater MVA to Assets, with ratings had a higher tendency to issue bonds. Surprisingly, younger firms (lower Age) had also a higher tendency to have outstanding bonds. This finding already points to a shift in the market's behavior during this period.
As for Bond to LTD, we discover that smaller firms with lower MVA to Assets relied more on bonds than other types of debt. More interestingly, firms with rating of BBB or higher had a larger portion of bond liabilities on their accounts than firms rated A and in a similar scale as firms rated AA or higher. This finding is especially striking when compared with the findings for 2004.
Assuming that higher quality firms are indeed larger firms with higher marketto-book ratio and higher ratings, the findings in Table 5 could be interpreted as follows:
higher quality (lower quality) firms had greater (lesser) chances of having public debt.
However, high-quality (low-quality) firms that did issue public debt had a lower (higher) percentage of public debt out of their total long-term debt. These findings suggest that once low-quality firms entered the bond market, they preferred bond liabilities over bank loans. This may reflect a view that bond liabilities embed a haircut option by the issuer that is not available for bank loans. Bank's expertise and monitoring skills pushed low-quality firms to prefer bonds over bank loans.
The coefficient of Dummy: rated is positive and statistically significant in the first step of the Heckman model. It appears that being rated correlates positively with outstanding corporate bonds. This finding is in line with theoretical predictions including those of Diamond (1989) , Diamond (1991) , Loyes (1988), Berlin & Mester (1992) , Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and Cantillo and Wright (2000) .
This finding is also consistent with the empirical examination of Faulkender and Petersen (2006) , using US data.
The results of the second step are compatible with Diamond's (1991) model that predicted firms with a credit rating toward the middle of the spectrum rely on bank loans. However, the results of the first step reveal a different relationship, in which the higher quality firms were the ones who issued corporate bonds.
Did high-risk firms issue more bonds?
To examine the robustness of our results we estimate the effect of reliance on bonds on the probability of default. For this purpose, we run random-effect Probit regressions for the probability of default. The sample used for this step consists of all 
Were institutional investors responsible for the lax screening?
Lastly, we wish to examine whether the tendency of low-quality firms to rely on bonds was indeed due to lax screening by institutional investors. To investigate this question we use the share of institutional investor (SII) in the funds raised by corporate bond issuers. We manually collected data on corporate bond new offerings during the years 2004-2009, and were able to identify the funds directly raised from the institutional investors. SII is the share of funds raised from institutional investors through bonds in a calendar year out of the total amount raised from issuance of bonds to unrelated firms (i.e. excluding parent, sister and subsidiary companies). Table 7 displays the mean and median Bond to LTD and ratings in the various ranges of SII. Both Bond to LTD and ratings are lagged one year. For example, the average Bond to LTD in the previous year to bond issuances with institutional investors share of SII=0.8 was 0.256 and a share of 0.069 of these bonds had a rating of A.
Interestingly, Table 7 shows that financial institutions do not avoid bond offerings of non-rated firms. However, the majority of cases where SII>0.8 are bonds rated A or higher while the majority of the cases where 0 < ≤ 0.8 are of non-rated bonds. The behavior of Bond to LTD with respect to SII is non-monotonic. SII=0.8 appears to be the default for the lowest Bond to LTD. However, as also reflected in Figure 4 , the higher the Bond to LTD, institutional investors tend either to reduce their share or to increase it. Reducing SII where Bond to LTD may be attributed to the higher default risk characterizing these firms as shown in the previous analyses. However, the rise of SII with Bond to LTD is evidence of lax screening. Instead of reducing their share in bonds of firms with high Bond to LTD institutional investors in fact increased their demand, enabling these firms to increase their reliance on bonds even more.
Lastly, we examine the statistical significance of these findings. Since we divide SII into five categorical variables, we choose Bond to LTD as the dependent variable rather than an explanatory variable. We also control for the level of credit risk by using rating dummy variables. If institutional investors are responsible for the higher Bond to LTD of firms, we should expect increasing monotonic coefficients of the SII dummies.
That means that we should expect to have higher Bond to LTD when the share of institutional investors in bond issuances increases. Conservative, responsible behavior of institutional investors should be reflected in decreasing coefficients. (Remember that the dependent variable Bond to LTD is lagged one year.) Therefore, the estimated coefficients reflect the response, in terms of their share in bond purchases to the Bond to LTD they observe at the time of the offering. Table 8 reports the results of the random-effect regressions. SII=0.8 and nonrated firms are the benchmark (omitted dummy variables) in this regression. We observe the U-shape in Bond to LTD both regarding ratings and SII. As in Table 5 , firms rated AA or higher and firms rated BBB or lower have a higher Bond to LTD than firms rated A. The differences are also statistically significant. The new, interesting finding is that the lower the SII than 0.8 or the higher the SII than 0.8, the higher is Bond to LTD. The interpretation of these findings is that institutional investors facing firms with higher Bond to LTD either reduced their share as a response to the lower firm quality or increased their share. The latter finding which is also statistically significant after controlling for ratings is a smoking gun for lax screening on the corporate bond market.
Summary & Conclusions
The findings of this paper suggest that higher quality (lower quality) firms have greater (lesser) chances of issuing bonds, indicating accessibility to the public debt market. In addition, among the firms that were able to issue bonds, higher quality (lower quality) firms had a lower (higher) percentage of public debt out of the firm's overall long-term debt. From the perspective of lower quality firms, these findings may indicate that lower quality firms have fewer chances to issue bonds, but if they manage to do so, they take advantage of this opportunity to issue a large percent of public debt out of their total debt.
These results are consistent with allegations that, during the sample period, Israeli institutional investors lacked experience in credit analysis and therefore the firms were subject to lax screening. As a result, some low-quality firms managed to issue bonds, and then replaced a large portion of their private debt with public debt, providing almost no collateral and no covenants. This situation exacerbated the agency problem inherent in credit markets, and firms used this situation not only to replace private debt with public debt but also to raise leverage, thus forcing a higher "haircut" (lower recovery rate) in case of default.
The results of this paper differ from those in studies conducted with US data. It would be valuable to conduct similar research on other emerging markets to evaluate whether the current empirical research is consistent with the situation in other young and growing credit markets. 
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